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Abstract 
1. If greenhouse gas concentrations were stabilized at their current level, existing 
 concentrations would commit the world to at least an additional 1.1°F (0.6°C) of 
 warming over this century relative to the last few decades (high confidence in continued 
 warming, medium confidence in amount of warming). 
 
 2. Over the next two decades, global temperature increase is projected to be between 0.5°F 
 and 1.3°F (0.3°–0.7°C) (medium confidence). This range is primarily due to uncertainties 
 in natural sources of variability that affect short-term trends. In some regions, this means 
 that the trend may not be distinguishable from natural variability (high confidence). 
  
3. Beyond the next few decades, the magnitude of climate change depends primarily on 
 cumulative emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols and the sensitivity of the climate 
 system to those emissions (high confidence). Projected changes range from 4.7°–8.6°F 
 (2.6°–4.8°C) under the higher RCP8.5 scenario to 0.5°–1.3°F (0.3°–1.7°C) under the 
 lower RCP2.6 scenario, for 2081–2100 relative to 1986–2005 (medium confidence). 
 
4. Global mean atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO216 ) concentration has now passed 400 ppm, a 
 level that last occurred about 3 million years ago, when global average temperature and 
 sea level were significantly higher than today (high confidence). Continued growth in 
 CO2 emissions over this century and beyond would lead to an atmospheric concentration 
 not experienced in tens of millions of years (medium confidence). The present-day 
 emissions rate of nearly 10 GtC per year suggests that there is no climate analog for this 
 century any time in at least the last 50 million years (medium confidence). 
 
 5. The observed increase in global carbon emissions over the past 15–20 years has been 
 consistent with higher scenarios (very high confidence). In 2014 and 2015, emission 
 growth rates slowed as economic growth has become less carbon-intensive (medium 
 confidence). Even if this trend continues, however, it is not yet at a rate that would meet 
 the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement of holding the increase in the 
 global average temperature to well below 3.6°F (2°C) above preindustrial levels (high confidence). 
 
 6. Combining output from global climate models and dynamical and statistical downscaling 
 models using advanced averaging, weighting, and pattern scaling approaches can result in 
 more relevant and robust future projections. For some regions, sectors, and impacts, these 
 techniques are increasing the ability of the scientific community to provide guidance on 
 the use of climate projections for quantifying regional-scale changes and impacts 
 (medium to high confidence).  
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4. Climate Models, Scenarios, and Projections 1 
KEY FINDINGS  2 
1. If greenhouse gas concentrations were stabilized at their current level, existing 3 
concentrations would commit the world to at least an additional 1.1°F (0.6°C) of 4 
warming over this century relative to the last few decades (high confidence in continued 5 
warming, medium confidence in amount of warming). 6 
2. Over the next two decades, global temperature increase is projected to be between 0.5°F 7 
and 1.3°F (0.3°–0.7°C) (medium confidence). This range is primarily due to uncertainties 8 
in natural sources of variability that affect short-term trends. In some regions, this means 9 
that the trend may not be distinguishable from natural variability (high confidence).  10 
3. Beyond the next few decades, the magnitude of climate change depends primarily on 11 
cumulative emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols and the sensitivity of the climate 12 
system to those emissions (high confidence). Projected changes range from 4.7°–8.6°F 13 
(2.6°–4.8°C) under the higher RCP8.5 scenario to 0.5°–1.3°F (0.3°–1.7°C) under the 14 
lower RCP2.6 scenario, for 2081–2100 relative to 1986–2005 (medium confidence). 15 
4. Global mean atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) concentration has now passed 400 ppm, a 16 
level that last occurred about 3 million years ago, when global average temperature and 17 
sea level were significantly higher than today (high confidence). Continued growth in 18 
CO2 emissions over this century and beyond would lead to an atmospheric concentration 19 
not experienced in tens of millions of years (medium confidence). The present-day 20 
emissions rate of nearly 10 GtC per year suggests that there is no climate analog for this 21 
century any time in at least the last 50 million years (medium confidence). 22 
5. The observed increase in global carbon emissions over the past 15–20 years has been 23 
consistent with higher scenarios (very high confidence). In 2014 and 2015, emission 24 
growth rates slowed as economic growth has become less carbon-intensive (medium 25 
confidence). Even if this trend continues, however, it is not yet at a rate that would meet 26 
the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement of holding the increase in the 27 
global average temperature to well below 3.6°F (2°C) above preindustrial levels (high 28 
confidence). 29 
6. Combining output from global climate models and dynamical and statistical downscaling 30 
models using advanced averaging, weighting, and pattern scaling approaches can result in 31 
more relevant and robust future projections. For some regions, sectors, and impacts, these 32 
techniques are increasing the ability of the scientific community to provide guidance on 33 
the use of climate projections for quantifying regional-scale changes and impacts 34 
(medium to high confidence). 35 
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4.1. The Human Role in Future Climate 1 
The Earth’s climate, past and future, is not static; it changes in response to both natural and 2 
anthropogenic drivers (see Ch. 2: Physical Drivers of Climate Change). Human emissions of 3 
carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and other greenhouse gases now overwhelm the influence 4 
of natural drivers on the external forcing of the Earth’s climate (see Ch. 3: Detection and 5 
Attribution). Climate change (see Ch. 1: Our Globally Changing Climate) and ocean 6 
acidification (see Ch. 13: Ocean Changes) are already occurring due to the buildup of 7 
atmospheric CO2 from human emissions in the industrial era (Hartmann et al. 2013; Rhein et al. 8 
2013).  9 
Even if existing concentrations could be immediately stabilized, temperature would continue to 10 
increase by an estimated 1.1°F (0.6°C) over this century, relative to 1980–1999 (Collins et al. 11 
2013). This is because of the long timescale over which some climate feedbacks act (Ch. 2: 12 
Physical Drivers of Climate Change). Over the next few decades, concentrations are projected to 13 
increase and the resulting global temperature increase is projected to range from 0.5°F to 1.3°F 14 
(0.3°C to 0.7°C). This range depends on natural variability, on emissions of short-lived species 15 
such as CH4 and black carbon that contribute to warming, and on emissions of sulfur dioxide 16 
(SO2) and other aerosols that have a net cooling effect (Ch. 2: Physical Drivers of Climate 17 
Change). The role of emission reductions of non-CO2 gases and aerosols in achieving various 18 
global temperature targets is discussed in Chapter 14: Mitigation. 19 
Over the past 15–20 years, the growth rate in carbon emissions from human activities has 20 
increased from 1.5 to 2 parts per million (ppm) per year due to increasing carbon emissions from 21 
human activities that track the rate projected under higher scenarios, in large part to growing 22 
contributions from developing economies (Tans and Keeling 2017; Raupach et al. 2007; Le 23 
Quéré et al. 2009). One possible analog for the rapid pace of change occurring today is the 24 
relatively abrupt warming of 9°–14°F (5°–8°C) that occurred during the Paleocene-Eocene 25 
Thermal Maximum (PETM), approximately 55–56 million years ago (Bowen et al. 2015; 26 
Kirtland Turner et al. 2014; Penman et al. 2014; Crowley et al. 1990). However, emissions today 27 
are nearly 10 GtC per year. During the PETM, the rate of maximum sustained carbon release was 28 
less than 1.1 GtC per year, with significant differences in both background conditions and 29 
forcing relative to today. This suggests that there is no precise past analog any time in the last 66 30 
million years for the conditions occurring today (Zeebe et al. 2016; Crowley et al. 1990). 31 
Since 2014, growth rates of global carbon emissions have declined, a trend cautiously attributed 32 
to declining coal use in China, despite large uncertainties in emissions reporting (Jackson et al. 33 
2016; Korsbakken et al. 2016). Economic growth is becoming less carbon-intensive, as both 34 
developed and emerging economies begin to phase out coal and transition to natural gas and 35 
renewable, non-carbon energy (IEA 2016; Green and Stern 2016).  36 
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Beyond the next few decades, the magnitude of future climate change will be primarily a 1 
function of future carbon emissions and the response of the climate system to those emissions. 2 
This chapter describes the scenarios that provide the basis for the range of future projections 3 
presented in this report: from those consistent with continued increases in greenhouse gas 4 
emissions, to others that can only be achieved by various levels of emission reductions (see Ch. 5 
14: Mitigation). This chapter also describes the models used to quantify projected changes at the 6 
global to regional scale and how it is possible to estimate the range in potential climate change—7 
as determined by climate sensitivity, which is the response of global temperature to a natural or 8 
anthropogenic forcing (see Ch. 2: Physical Drivers of Climate Change)—that would result from 9 
a given scenario (Collins et al. 2013).  10 
4.2. Future Scenarios 11 
Climate projections are typically presented for a range of plausible pathways, scenarios, or 12 
targets that capture the relationships between human choices, emissions, concentrations, and 13 
temperature change. Some scenarios are consistent with continued dependence on fossil fuels, 14 
while others can only be achieved by deliberate actions to reduce emissions. The resulting range 15 
reflects the uncertainty inherent in quantifying human activities (including technological change) 16 
and their influence on climate.  17 
The first Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Assessment Report (IPCC FAR) in 1990 18 
discussed three types of scenarios: equilibrium scenarios, in which CO2 concentration is fixed; 19 
transient scenarios, in which CO2 concentration increased by a fixed percentage each year over 20 
the duration of the scenario; and four brand-new Scientific Assessment (SA90) emission 21 
scenarios based on World Bank population projections (Bretherton et al. 1990). Today, that 22 
original portfolio has expanded to encompass a wide variety of time-dependent or transient 23 
scenarios that project how population, energy sources, technology, emissions, atmospheric 24 
concentrations, radiative forcing, and/or global temperature change over time.  25 
Other scenarios are simply expressed in terms of an end-goal or target, such as capping 26 
cumulative carbon emissions at a specific level or stabilizing global temperature at or below a 27 
certain threshold. The 2015 Paris Agreement, for example, includes an aim of “holding the 28 
increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and 29 
pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels” 30 
(UNFCCC 2015). To stabilize climate, however, it is not enough to halt the growth in annual 31 
carbon emissions. It is projected that global net carbon emissions will eventually need to reach 32 
zero (Collins et al. 2013) and negative emissions may be needed for a greater than 50% chance 33 
of limiting warming below 3.6°F (2°C) (Smith et al. 2016; see also Ch. 14: Mitigation for a 34 
discussion of negative emissions scenarios). 35 
And finally some scenarios, like the “commitment” scenario in Key Finding 1 and the fixed-CO2 36 
equilibrium scenarios described above, continue to explore hypothetical questions such as, “what 37 
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would the world look like, long-term, if humans were able to stabilize atmospheric CO2 1 
concentration at a given level?” This section describes the different types of scenarios used 2 
today, and their relevance to assessing impacts and informing policy targets. 3 
4.2.1. Emission Scenarios, Representative Concentration Pathways, and 4 
Shared Socioeconomic Pathways 5 
The standard sets of time-dependent scenarios used by the climate modeling community as input 6 
to global climate model simulations provide the basis for the majority of the future projections 7 
presented in IPCC assessment reports and U.S. National Climate Assessments (NCA). 8 
Developed by the integrated assessment modeling community, these sets of standard scenarios 9 
have become more comprehensive with each new generation, as the original SA90 scenarios 10 
(IPCC 1990) were replaced by the IS92 emission scenarios of the 1990s (Leggett et al. 1992), 11 
which were in turn succeeded by the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios in 2000 (SRES, 12 
Nakicenovic et al. 2000) and by the Representative Concentration Pathways in 2010 (RCPs, 13 
Moss et al. 2010). 14 
SA90, IS92, and SRES are all emission-based scenarios. They begin with a set of storylines that 15 
were based on population projections initially. By SRES, they had become much more complex, 16 
laying out a consistent picture of demographics, international trade, flow of information and 17 
technology, and other social, technological, and economic characteristics of future worlds. These 18 
assumptions are then fed through socioeconomic and Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) to 19 
derive emissions. For SRES, the use of various IAMs resulted in multiple emissions scenarios 20 
corresponding to each storyline; however, one scenario for each storyline was selected as the 21 
representative “marker” scenario to be used as input to global models to calculate the resulting 22 
atmospheric concentrations, radiative forcing, and climate change for the higher A1fi (fossil-23 
intensive), mid-high A2, mid-low B2, and lower B1 storylines. IS92-based projections were used 24 
in the IPCC Second and Third Assessment Reports (SAR and TAR; Kattenberg et al. 1996; 25 
Cubasch et al. 2001) and the first NCA (NAST 2001). Projections based on SRES scenarios were 26 
used in the second and third NCAs (Karl et al. 2009; Melillo et al. 2014) as well as the IPCC 27 
TAR and Fourth Assessment Reports (AR4; Cubasch et al. 2001; Meehl et al. 2007). 28 
The most recent set of time-dependent scenarios, RCPs, builds on these two decades of scenario 29 
development. However, RCPs differ from previous sets of standard scenarios in at least four 30 
important ways. First, RCPs are not emissions scenarios; they are radiative forcing scenarios. 31 
Each scenario is tied to one value: the change in radiative forcing at the tropopause by 2100 32 
relative to preindustrial levels. The four RCPs are numbered according to the change in radiative 33 
forcing by 2100: +2.6, +4.5, +6.0 and +8.5 watts per square meter (W/m2) (van Vuuren et al. 34 
2011; Thomson et al. 2011; Masui et al. 2011; Riahi et al. 2011).  35 
The second difference is that, starting from these radiative forcing values, IAMs are used to work 36 
backwards to derive a range of emissions trajectories and corresponding policies and 37 
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technological strategies for each RCP that would achieve the same ultimate impact on radiative 1 
forcing. From the multiple emissions pathways that could lead to the same 2100 radiative forcing 2 
value, an associated pathway of annual carbon dioxide and other anthropogenic emissions of 3 
greenhouse gases, aerosols, air pollutants, and other short-lived species has been selected for 4 
each RCP to use as input to future climate model simulations (e.g., Meinshausen et al. 2011; 5 
Cubasch et al. 2013). In addition, RCPs provide climate modelers with gridded trajectories of 6 
land use and land cover.  7 
A third difference between the RCPs and previous scenarios is that while none of the SRES 8 
scenarios included a scenario with explicit policies and measures to limit climate forcing, all of 9 
the three lower RCP scenarios (2.6, 4.5, and 6.0) are climate-policy scenarios. At the higher end 10 
of the range, the RCP8.5 scenario corresponds to a future where carbon and methane emissions 11 
continue to rise as a result of fossil fuel use, albeit with significant declines in emission growth 12 
rates over the second half of the century (Figure 4.1), significant reduction in aerosols, and 13 
modest improvements in energy intensity and technology (Riahi et al. 2011). Atmospheric 14 
carbon dioxide levels for RCP8.5 are similar to those of the SRES A1fi scenario: they rise from 15 
current-day levels of 400 up to 936 parts per million (ppm). CO2-equivalent levels (including 16 
emissions of other non-CO2 greenhouse gases, aerosols, and other substances that affect climate) 17 
reach more than 1200 ppm by 2100, and global temperature is projected to increase by 5.4°–18 
9.9°F (3°–5.5°C) by 2100 relative to the 1986–2005 average. RCP8.5 reflects the upper range of 19 
the open literature on emissions, but is not intended to serve as an upper limit on possible 20 
emissions nor as a business-as-usual or reference scenario for the other three scenarios.  21 
Under the lower RCP4.5 and RCP2.6 scenarios (van Vuuren et al. 2011; Thomson et al. 2011), 22 
atmospheric CO2 levels remain below 550 and 450 ppm by 2100, respectively. Emissions of 23 
other substances are also lower; by 2100, CO2-equivalent concentrations that include all 24 
emissions from human activities reach 580 ppm under RCP4.5 and 425 ppm under RCP2.6. 25 
RCP4.5 is similar to SRES B1, but the RCP2.6 scenario is much lower than any SRES scenario 26 
because it includes the option of using policies to achieve net negative carbon dioxide emissions 27 
before the end of the century, while SRES scenarios do not. RCP-based projections were used in 28 
the most recent IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5; Collins et al. 2013) and the third NCA 29 
(Melillo et al. 2014) and will be used in the upcoming fourth NCA as well. 30 
Within the RCP family, individual scenarios have not been assigned a formal likelihood. Higher-31 
numbered scenarios correspond to higher emissions and a larger and more rapid global 32 
temperature change (Figure 4.1); the range of values covered by the scenarios was chosen to 33 
reflect the then-current range in the open literature. Since the choice of scenario constrains the 34 
magnitudes of future changes, most assessments (including this one; see Ch. 6: Temperature 35 
Change) quantify future change and corresponding impacts under a range of future scenarios that 36 
reflect the uncertainty in the consequences of human choices over the coming century.  37 
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1 Fourth , a broad range of socioeconomic scenarios were developed independently from the Reps 
2 and a subset of these constrained , using emissions limitations policies consistent with their 
3 underlying storylines, to create five Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) widl climate 
4 forcing that matches the Rep values. This pairing of SSPs and Reps is designed to meet the 
5 needs of dIe impacts, adaptation , and vulnerability (IA V) communities, enabling them to couple 
6 alternative socioeconomic scenarios widl the climate scenarios developed using Reps to explore 
7 the socioeconomic challenges to climate mitigation and adaptation (O 'Neill et al. 20 14). The five 
8 SSPs consist of SSP! ("Sustainability"; low challenges to mitigation and adaptation) , SSP2 
9 ("Middle of the Road"; middle challenges to mitigation and adaptation), SSP3 ("Regional 
10 Rivalry"; high challenges to mitigation and adaptation) , SSP4 ("Inequality"; low challenges to 
11 mitigation , high challenges to adaptation), and SSPS ("Fossil-fueled Development"; high 
12 challenges to mitigation , low challenges to adaptation) . Each scenario has an underlying SSP 
13 narrative , as well as consistent assumptions regarding demographics, urbanization, economic 
14 growth, and technology development. Only SSPS produces a reference scenario that is consistent 
15 with RCP8.5; climate forcing in the odler SSPs' reference scenarios that don't include climate 
16 policy remains below 8.5 W /m2• In addition, the nature of SSP3 makes it impossible for that 
17 scenario to produce a climate forcing as low as 2 .6 W /m2• While new research is under way to 
18 explore scenarios that limit climate forcing to 2.0 W 1m2 , neither the RCPs nor the SSPs have 
19 produced scenarios in that range . 
20 [INSERT FIGURE 4.1 HERE] 
21 4.2.2. Alternative Scenarios 
22 The emissions and radiative forcing scenarios described above include a component of time: how 
23 much will climate change, and by when? Ultimately, however , the magnitude of human-induced 
24 climate change depends less on the year-to-year emissions dIan it does on the net amount of 
25 carbon, or cumulative carbon, emitted into dIe atmosphere . TIle lower dIe atmospheric 
26 concentrations of CO2, the greater the chance that eventual global temperature change will not 
27 reach the high-end temperature projections, or possibly remain below 3 .6°F (2°C) relative to 
28 preindustrial levels, consistent with the long-tenn temperature goal included in the Paris 
29 Agreement . 
30 Cumulative carbon targets offer an altemative approach to expressing a goal designed to limit 
31 global temperature to a certain level. As discussed in Chapter 14: Mitigation , it is possible to 
32 quantify the expected amount of carbon that can be emitted globally in order to meet a specific 
33 global wanning target such as 3 .6°F (2°C) or even 2.TF (l.5°C)-aldlough if current carbon 
34 emission rates of just under 10 GtC per year were to continue, the lower target would be reached 
35 in a matter of years . The higher target would be reached in a matter of decades (see Ch. 14: 
36 Mitigation) . 
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1 Under RCP4.5 , global temperature change is more likely than not to exceed 3 .6°F (2°e) (IIASA 
2 20 16; Collins et al . 2013) , whereas under RCP2.6 it is likely to remain below 3 .6°F (2°e) 
3 (Sanderson et al. 2016a; Collins et al. 2013) . While new research is under way to explore 
4 scenarios consistent with limiting climate forcing to 2.0 W 1m2 , a level consistent with limiting 
5 global mean surface temperature change to 2.TF (1.5°C), neither dIe Reps nor dIe SSPs have 
6 produced scenarios dlat allow for such a small amount of temperature change (Sanderson et al . 
7 20 16a; see also Ch. 14: Mitigation). 
8 [INSERT FIGURE 4.2 HERE] 
9 Future projections are most COllllllOllly summarized for a given future scenario (for example , 
10 RCP8.5 or 4.5) over a range of future climatological time periods (for example, temperature 
11 change in 2040--2079 or 2070--2099 relative to 1980- 2009) . While this approach has dIe 
12 advantage of developing projections for a specific time horizon, uncertainty in future projections 
13 is relatively high , incorporating bodl the uncertainty due to multiple scenarios as well as 
14 uncertainty regarding the response of the climate system to human emissions. These 
15 lmcertainties increase the further out in time the projections go. Using these same transient, 
16 scenario-based simulations, however, it is possible to analyze the projected changes for a given 
17 global mean temperature (GMT) threshold by extracting a time slice (typically 20 years) 
18 centered arOlmd the point in time at which that change is reached (Fig. 4.2). 
19 Derived GMT scenarios offer a way for the public and policymakers to lmderstand the impacts 
20 for any given temperature threshold, as many physical changes and impacts have been shown to 
21 scale with global mean surface temperature (GMT), including shifts in average precipitation, 
22 extreme heat, nmoff, drought risk, wildfire, temperahrre-related crop yield changes, and even 
23 risk of coral bleaching (e.g. , NRC 2011; Collins et al. 2013; Frieler et al. 2013; Swain and 
24 Hayhoe 2015). They also allow scientists to highlight the effect of global mean temperahrre on 
25 projected regional change by de-emphasizing the lmcertainty due to both climate sensitivity and 
26 future scenarios (Herger et al. 201 5; Swain and Hayhoe 201 5). This approach is less useful for 
27 those impacts that vary based on rate of change, such as species migrations, or where equilibrium 
28 changes are very different from transient effects , such as sea level rise. 
29 Pattern scaling techniques (Mitchell 2003) are based on a similar assumption to GMT scenarios, 
30 namely that large-scale patterns of regional change will scale widl global temperature change. 
31 These techniques can be used to quantify regional projections for scenarios that are not readily 
32 available in preexisting databases of global climate model simulations, including changes in both 
33 mean and extremes (e .g. , Fix et a1. 2016). A comprehensive assessment both confinlls and 
34 constrains the validity of applying pattern scaling to quantify climate response to a range of 
35 projected future changes (Tebaldi and Arblaster 20 14). For temperature-based climate targets, 
36 these pattem scaling frames or GMT scenarios offer dIe basis for more consistent comparisons 
37 across studies examining regional change or potential risks and impacts. 
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4.2.3. Analogs from the Paleoclimate Record 1 
Most CMIP5 simulations project transient changes in climate through 2100; a few simulations 2 
extend to 2200, 2300, or beyond. However, as discussed in Chapter 2: Physical Drivers of 3 
Climate Change, the long-term impact of human activities on the carbon cycle and Earth’s 4 
climate over the next few decades and for the remainder of this century can only be assessed by 5 
considering changes that occur over multiple centuries and even millennia (NRC 2011).  6 
In the past, there have been several examples of “hothouse” climates where carbon dioxide 7 
concentrations and/or global mean temperatures were similar to preindustrial, current, or 8 
plausible future levels. These periods are sometimes referenced as analogs, albeit imperfect and 9 
incomplete, of future climate (e.g., Crowley 1990).  10 
The last interglacial period, approximately 125,000 years ago, is known as the Eemian. During 11 
that time, CO2 concentration was similar to preindustrial, around 280 ppm (Schneider et al. 12 
2013). Global mean temperature was approximately 1.8°–3.6°F (1°–2°C) higher than 13 
preindustrial levels (Lunt et al. 2012; Otto-Bleisner et al. 2013), although the poles were 14 
significantly warmer (NEEM 2013; Jouzel et al. 2007) and sea level was 6 to 9 meters (20 to 30 15 
feet) higher than today (Fig. 4.3; Kopp et al. 2009). During the Pliocene, approximately 3 million 16 
years ago, long-term CO2 concentration was similar to today’s, around 400 ppm (Seki et al. 17 
2010)—although this level was sustained over long periods of time, whereas today CO2 18 
concentration is increasing rapidly. At that time, global mean temperature was approximately 19 
3.6°–6.3°F (2°–3.5°C) above preindustrial, and sea level was somewhere between 66 ± 33 feet 20 
(20 ± 10 meters) higher than today (Haywood et al. 2013; Dutton et al. 2015; Miller et al. 2012).  21 
Under the RCP8.5 scenario, CO2 concentrations are projected to reach 936 ppm by 2100. During 22 
the Eocene, 35 to 55 million years ago, CO2 levels were between 680 and 1260 ppm, or 23 
somewhere between two and a half to four and a half times above preindustrial levels (Jagniecki 24 
et al. 2015). If Eocene conditions are used as an analog, this suggests that if the CO2 25 
concentrations projected to occur under the RCP8.5 scenario by 2100 were sustained over long 26 
periods of time, global temperatures would be approximately 9°–14°F (5°–8°C) above 27 
preindustrial levels (Royer 2014). During the Eocene, there were no permanent land-based ice 28 
sheets; Antarctic glaciation did not begin until approximately 34 million years ago (Pagani et al. 29 
2011). Calibrating sea level rise models against past climate suggests that, under the RCP8.5 30 
scenario, Antarctica could contribute 3 feet (1 meter) of sea level rise by 2100 and 50 feet (15 31 
meters) by 2500 (DeConto and Pollard 2016). If atmospheric CO2 were sustained at levels 32 
approximately two to three times above preindustrial for tens of thousands of years, it is 33 
estimated that Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets could melt entirely (Gasson et al. 2014), 34 
resulting in approximately 215 feet (65 meters) of sea level rise (Vaughn et al. 2013). 35 
  36 
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4.3. Modeling Tools 1 
Using transient scenarios such as SRES and RCP as input, global climate models (GCMs) 2 
produce trajectories of future climate change, including global and regional changes in 3 
temperature, precipitation, and other physical characteristics of the climate system (Collins et al. 4 
2013; Kirtman et al. 2013; see also Ch. 6: Temperature Change and Ch. 7: Precipitation Change). 5 
The resolution of global models has increased significantly since IPCC FAR (IPCC 1990). 6 
However, even the latest experimental high-resolution simulations at 25–50 km (15–30 miles) 7 
per gridbox, are unable to simulate all of the important fine-scale processes occurring at regional 8 
to local scales. Instead, downscaling methods are often used to correct systematic biases, or 9 
offsets relative to observations, in global projections and translate them into the higher-resolution 10 
information typically required for impact assessments.  11 
Dynamical downscaling with regional climate models (RCMs) directly simulates the response of 12 
regional climate processes to global change, while empirical statistical downscaling models 13 
(ESDMs) tend to be more flexible and computationally efficient. Comparing the ability of 14 
dynamical and statistical methods to reproduce observed climate shows that the relative 15 
performance of the two approaches depends on the assessment criteria (Vattinada Ayar et al. 16 
2016). Although dynamical and statistical methods can be combined into a hybrid framework, 17 
many assessments still tend to rely on one or the other type of downscaling, where the choice is 18 
based on the needs of the assessment. The projections shown in this report, for example, are 19 
either based on the original GCM simulations or on simulations that have been statistically 20 
downscaled using the LOcalized Constructed Analogs method (LOCA; Pierce et al. 2014). This 21 
section describes the global climate models used today, briefly summarizes their development 22 
over the past few decades, and explains the general characteristics and relative strengths and 23 
weaknesses of the dynamical and statistical downscaling. 24 
4.3.1. Global Climate Models 25 
Global climate models (GCMs) are mathematical frameworks that were originally built on 26 
fundamental equations of physics. They account for the conservation of energy, mass, and 27 
momentum and how these are exchanged among different components of the climate system. 28 
Using these fundamental relationships, GCMs are able to simulate many important aspects of 29 
Earth’s climate: large-scale patterns of temperature and precipitation, general characteristics of 30 
storm tracks and extratropical cyclones, and observed changes in global mean temperature and 31 
ocean heat content as a result of human emissions (Flato et al. 2013).  32 
 The complexity of climate models has grown over time, as they incorporate additional 33 
components of the Earth’s climate system (Figure 4.3). For example, GCMs were previously 34 
referred to as “general circulation models” when they included only the physics needed to 35 
simulate the general circulation of the atmosphere. Today, global climate models simulate many 36 
more aspects of the climate system: atmospheric chemistry and aerosols, land surface 37 
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interactions including soil and vegetation, land and sea ice, and increasingly even an interactive 1 
carbon cycle and/or biogeochemistry. Models that include this last component are also referred 2 
to as Earth system models (ESMs). 3 
[INSERT FIGURE 4.3 HERE] 4 
In addition to expanding the number of processes in the models and improving the treatment of 5 
existing processes, the total number of GCMs and the average horizontal spatial resolution of the 6 
models has increased over time, as computers become more powerful, and with each successive 7 
version of the World Climate Research Programme’s (WCRP’s) Coupled Model 8 
Intercomparison Project (CMIP). CMIP5 provides output from over 50 GCMs with spatial 9 
resolutions ranging from about 50 to 300 km (30 to 200 miles) per horizontal size and variable 10 
vertical resolution on the order of hundreds of meters in the troposphere or lower atmosphere.  11 
It is often assumed that higher-resolution, more complex, and more up-to-date models will 12 
perform better and/or produce more robust projections than previous-generation models. 13 
However, a large body of research comparing CMIP3 and CMIP5 simulations concludes that, 14 
although the spatial resolution of CMIP5 has improved relative to CMIP3, the overall 15 
improvement in performance is relatively minor. For certain variables, regions, and seasons, 16 
there is some improvement; for others, there is little difference or even sometimes degradation in 17 
performance, as greater complexity does not necessarily imply improved performance (Knutti 18 
and Sedlacek 2012; Kumar et al. 2014; Sheffield et al. 2013, 2014). CMIP5 simulations do show 19 
modest improvement in model ability to simulate ENSO (Bellenger et al. 2014), some aspects of 20 
cloud characteristics (Lauer and Hamilton 2012), and the rate of Arctic sea ice loss (Wang and 21 
Overland 2012), as well as greater consensus regarding projected drying in the southwestern 22 
United States and Mexico (Sheffield et al. 2014), 23 
Projected changes in hurricane rainfall rates and the reduction in tropical storm frequency are 24 
similar, but CMIP5-based projections of increases in the frequency of the strongest hurricanes 25 
are generally smaller than CMIP3-based projections (Knutson et al. 2013). On the other hand, 26 
many studies find little to no significant difference in large-scale patterns of changes in both 27 
mean and extreme temperature and precipitation from CMIP3 to CMIP5 (Kharin et al. 2013; 28 
Knutti and Sedlacek 2013; Sheffield et al. 2014; Sun et al. 2015). Also, CMIP3 simulations are 29 
driven by SRES scenarios, while CMIP5 simulations are driven by RCP scenarios. Although 30 
some scenarios have comparable CO2 concentration pathways (Figure 4.1), differences in non-31 
CO2 species and aerosols could be responsible for some of the differences between the 32 
simulations (Sheffield et al. 2014). In NCA3, projections were based on simulations from both 33 
CMIP3 and CMIP5. In this report, future projections are based on CMIP5 alone. 34 
GCMs are constantly being expanded to include more physics, chemistry, and, increasingly, even 35 
the biology and biogeochemistry at work in the climate system (Figure 4.3). Interactions within 36 
and between the various components of the climate system result in positive and negative 37 
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feedbacks that can act to enhance or dampen the effect of human emissions on the climate 1 
system. The extent to which models explicitly resolve or incorporate these processes determines 2 
their climate sensitivity, or response to external forcing (see Ch. 2: Physical Drivers of Climate 3 
Change, Section 2.5 on climate sensitivity, and Ch. 15: Potential Surprises on the importance of 4 
processes not included in present-day GCMs). These models build on previous generations and 5 
therefore many models are not independent from each other. Many share both ideas and model 6 
components or code, complicating the interpretation of multimodel ensembles that often are 7 
assumed to be independent (Knutti et al. 2013; Sanderson et al. 2015). Consideration of the 8 
independence of different models is one of the key pieces of information going into the 9 
weighting approach used in this report (see Appendix B: Weighting Strategy). 10 
4.3.2. Regional Climate Models 11 
Dynamical downscaling models are often referred to as regional climate models (RCMs), since 12 
they include many of the same physical processes that make up a global climate model, but 13 
simulate these processes at higher spatial resolution over smaller regions, such as the western or 14 
eastern United States (Figure 4.4; Kotamarthi et al. 2016). Most RCM simulations use GCM 15 
fields from pre-computed global simulations as boundary conditions. This approach allows 16 
RCMs to draw from a broad set of GCM simulations, such as CMIP5, but does not allow for 17 
possible two-way feedbacks and interactions between the regional to global scales. Dynamical 18 
downscaling can also be conducted interactively through nesting a higher-resolution regional 19 
grid or model into a global model during a simulation. Both approaches directly simulate the 20 
dynamics of the regional climate system, but only the second allows for two-way interactions 21 
between regional and global change. 22 
RCMs are computationally intensive, providing a broad range of output variables that resolve 23 
regional climate features important for assessing climate impacts. The size of individual grid 24 
cells can be as fine as 1 to 2 km (0.6 to 1.2 miles) per gridbox in some studies, but more 25 
commonly range from about 10 to 50 km (6 to 30 miles). At smaller spatial scales, and for 26 
specific variables and areas with complex terrain, such as coastlines or mountains, regional 27 
climate models have been shown to add value (Feser et al. 2011). As model resolution increases, 28 
RCMs are also able to explicitly resolve some processes that are parameterized in global models. 29 
For example, some models with spatial scales below 4 km (2.5 miles) are able to dispense with 30 
the parameterization of convective precipitation, a significant source of error and uncertainty in 31 
coarser models (Prein et al. 2015). RCMs can also incorporate changes in land use, land cover, or 32 
hydrology into local climate at spatial scales relevant to planning and decision-making at the 33 
regional level. 34 
Despite the differences in resolution, RCMs are still subject to many of the same types of 35 
uncertainty as GCMs. Even the highest-resolution RCM cannot explicitly model physical 36 
processes that occur at even smaller scales than the model is able to resolve; instead, 37 
parameterizations are required. Similarly, RCMs might not include a process or an interaction 38 
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1 that is not yet well understood , even if it is able to be resolved at the spatial scale of the model. 
2 One additional source of uncertainty unique to RCMs arises from dIe fact that at their boundaries 
3 RCMs require output from GeMs to provide large-scale circulation such as winds, temperature , 
4 and moisture; the degree to which the driving GeM correctly captures large-scale circulation and 
5 climate will affect dIe perfomlance of the ReM (Wang et al . 2(04). RCMs can be evaluated by 
6 directly comparing their output to observations; although this process can be challenging and 
7 time-consuming , it is often necessary to quantify dIe appropriate level of confidence that can be 
8 placed in their output (Kotamardti et al. 2016). 
9 Studies have also highlighted the importance of large ensemble simulations when quantifying 
10 regional change (Xie et al. 20 15) . However , due to their computational demand , extensive 
11 ensembles of RCM-based projections are rare. The largest ensemble of RCM simulations for 
12 North America is hosted by the North American Regional Climate Change Assessment Program 
13 (NARCCAP). NARCCAP simulations are useful for examining patterns of change over North 
14 America and providing a broad suite of surface and upper-air variables to characterize future 
15 impacts. Since this ensemble is based on four simulations from four CMIP3 GeMs for a single 
16 mid-high SRES scenario, these mns do not encompass the full range of uncertainty in future 
17 projections due to human activities, natural variability, and climate sensitivity. 
18 [INSERT FIGURE 4.4 HERE] 
19 4.3.3. Empirical Statistical Downscaling Models 
20 Empirical statistical downscaling models (ESDMs) combine GCM output widl historical 
21 observations to translate large-scale predictors or patterns into high-resolution projections at the 
22 scale of observations . The observations used in an ESDM can range from individual weather 
23 stations to gridded datasets . As output , they can generate a range of products, from large grids to 
24 analyses optimized for a specific location , variable, or decision-context . 
25 Statistical techniques are varied , from the simple difference or delta approaches used in the ftrst 
26 NCA (subtracting historical simulated values from future values, and adding dIe resulting delta 
27 to historical observations; NAST 2(01) to the parametric quantile mapping approach used in 
28 NCA2 and 3 (Stoner et al. 2012; Karl et al. 2009; Melillo et al. 2014) . Even more complex 
29 clustering and advanced mathematical modeling techniques can rival dynamical downscaling in 
30 their demand for computational resources (e .g. Vrac et al . 2(07) . 
31 Statistical models are generally flexible and less computationally demanding than RCMs. A 
32 number of databases using a variety of methods, including LOCA, provide statistically 
33 downscaled projections for a continuous period from 1960 to 2100 using a large ensemble of 
34 global models and a range of higher and lower future scenarios to capture uncertainty due to 
35 human activities. ESDMs are also effective at removing biases in historical simulated values, 
36 leading to a good match between dIe average (multidecadal) statistics of observed and 
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statistically downscaled climate at the spatial scale and over the historical period of the 1 
observational data used to train the statistical model. Unless methods can simultaneously 2 
downscale multiple variables, however, statistical downscaling carries the risk of altering some 3 
of the physical interdependences between variables. ESDMs are also limited in that they require 4 
observational data as input; the longer and more complete the record, the greater the confidence 5 
that the ESDM is being trained on a representative sample of climatic conditions for that 6 
location. Application of ESDMs to remote locations with sparse temporal and/or spatial records 7 
is challenging, though in many cases reanalysis (Brands et al. 2012) or even monthly satellite 8 
data (Thrasher et al. 2013) can be used in lieu of in situ observations. Lack of data availability 9 
can also limit the use of ESDMs in applications that require more variables than temperature and 10 
precipitation. Finally, statistical models are based on the key assumption that the relationship 11 
between large-scale weather systems and local climate or the spatial pattern of surface climate 12 
will remain stationary over the time horizon of the projections. This assumption may not hold if 13 
climate change alters local feedback processes that affect these relationships.  14 
ESDMs can be evaluated in three different ways, each of which provides useful insight into 15 
model performance (Kotamarthi et al. 2016). First, the model’s goodness-of-fit can be quantified 16 
by comparing downscaled simulations for the historical period with the identical observations 17 
used to train the model. Second, the generalizability of the model can be determined by 18 
comparing downscaled historical simulations with observations from a different time period than 19 
was used to train the model; this is often accomplished via cross-validation. Third and most 20 
importantly, the stationarity of the model can be evaluated through a “perfect model” experiment 21 
using coarse-resolution GCM simulations to generate future projections, then comparing these 22 
with high-resolution GCM simulations for the same future time period. Initial analyses using the 23 
perfect model approach have demonstrated that the assumption of stationarity can vary 24 
significantly by ESDM method, by quantile, and by the time scale (daily or monthly) of the 25 
GCM input (Dixon et al. 2016). 26 
ESDMs are best suited for analyses that require a broad range of future projections of standard, 27 
near-surface variables such as temperature and precipitation, at the scale of observations that 28 
may already be used for planning purposes. If the study needs to evaluate the full range of 29 
projected changes provided by multiple models and scenarios, then statistical downscaling may 30 
be more appropriate than dynamical downscaling. However, even within statistical downscaling, 31 
selecting an appropriate method for any given study depends on the questions being asked (see 32 
Kotamarthi et al. 2016 for further discussion on selection of appropriate downscaling methods). 33 
This report uses projections generated by the LOcalized Constructed Analogs approach (LOCA; 34 
Pierce et al. 2014) that spatially matches model-simulated days, past and future, to analogs from 35 
observations. 36 
  37 
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4.3.4. Averaging, Weighting, and Selection of Global Models 1 
The results of individual climate model simulations using the same inputs can differ from each 2 
other over shorter time scales ranging from several years to several decades (Deser et al. 3 
2012a,b). These differences are the result of normal, natural variability, as well as the various 4 
ways models characterize various small-scale processes. Although decadal predictability is an 5 
active research area (Deser et al. 2014), the timing of specific natural variations is largely 6 
unpredictable beyond several seasons. For this reason, multimodel simulations are generally 7 
averaged to remove the effects of randomly occurring natural variations from long-term trends 8 
and make it easier to discern the impact of external drivers, both human and natural, on the 9 
Earth’s climate. Multimodel averaging is typically the last stage in any analysis, used to prepare 10 
figures showing projected changes in quantities such as annual or seasonal temperature or 11 
precipitation (see Ch. 6: Temperature Change and Ch. 7: Precipitation Change). While the effect 12 
of averaging on the systematic errors depends on the extent to which models have similar errors 13 
or offsetting errors, there is growing recognition of the value of large ensembles of climate 14 
model simulations in addressing uncertainty in both natural variability and scientific modeling 15 
(e.g., Deser et al. 2012a).  16 
Previous assessments have used a simple average to calculate the multimodel ensemble. This 17 
approach implicitly assumes each climate model is independent from the others and of equal 18 
ability. Neither of these assumptions, however, are completely valid. Some models share many 19 
components with other models in the CMIP5 archive, whereas others have been developed 20 
largely in isolation (Knutti et al. 2013; Sanderson et al. 2015). Also, some models are more 21 
successful than others at replicating observed climate and trends over the past century, at 22 
simulating the large-scale dynamical features responsible for creating or affecting the average 23 
climate conditions over a certain region, such as the Arctic or the Caribbean (e.g., M. Wang et al. 24 
2007; C. Wang et al. 2014; Ryu and Hayhoe 2014), or at simulating past climates with very 25 
different states than present day (Braconnot et al. 2012). Evaluation of the success of a specific 26 
model often depends on the variable or metric being considered in the analysis, with some 27 
models performing better than others for certain regions or variables. However, all future 28 
simulations agree that both global and regional temperatures will increase over this century in 29 
response to increasing emissions of greenhouse gases from human activities. 30 
Can more sophisticated weighting or model selection schemes improve the quality of future 31 
projections? In the past, model weights were often based on historical performance; yet 32 
performance varies by region and variable, and may not equate to improved future projections 33 
(Knutti and Sedlacek 2013). For example, ranking GCMs based on their average biases in 34 
temperature gives a very different result than when the same models are ranked based on their 35 
ability to simulate observed temperature trends (Jun et al. 2008; Giorgi and Coppola 2010). If 36 
GCMs are weighted in a way that does not accurately capture the true uncertainty in regional 37 
change, the result can be less robust than an equally-weighted mean (Weigel et al. 2010). 38 
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Although the intent of weighting models is to increase the robustness of the projections, by 1 
giving lesser weight to outliers a weighting scheme may increase the risk of underestimating the 2 
range of uncertainty, a tendency that has already been noted in multi-model ensembles (see Ch. 3 
15: Potential Surprises). 4 
Despite these challenges, for the first time in an official U.S. Global Change Research Program 5 
report, this assessment uses model weighting to refine future climate change projections (Knutti 6 
et al. 2017; see also Appendix B: Weighting Strategy). The weighting approach is unique: it 7 
takes into account the interdependence of individual climate models as well as their relative 8 
abilities in simulating North American climate. Understanding of model history, together with 9 
the fingerprints of particular model biases, has been used to identify model pairs that are not 10 
independent. In this report, model independence and selected global and North American model 11 
quality metrics are considered in order to determine the weighting parameters (Knutti et al. 12 
2017). Evaluation of this approach shows improved performance of the weighted ensemble over 13 
the Arctic, a region where model-based trends often differ from observations, but little change in 14 
global-scale temperature response and in other regions where modeled and observed trends are 15 
similar, although there are small regional differences in the statistical significance of projected 16 
changes. The choice of metric used to evaluate models has very little effect on the independence 17 
weighting, and some moderate influence on the skill weighting if only a small number of 18 
variables are used to assess model quality. Because a large number of variables are combined to 19 
produce a comprehensive “skill metric,” the metric is not highly sensitive to any single variable. 20 
All multimodel figures in this report use the approach described in Appendix B: Weighting 21 
Strategy. 22 
4.4. Uncertainty in Future Projections 23 
The timing and magnitude of projected future climate change is uncertain due to the ambiguity 24 
introduced by human choices (as discussed in Section 4.2), natural variability, and scientific 25 
uncertainty (Hawkins and Sutton 2009, 2011; Deser et al. 2012a), which includes uncertainty in 26 
both scientific modeling and climate sensitivity (see Ch. 2: Physical Drivers of Climate Change). 27 
Confidence in projections of specific aspects of future climate change increases if formal 28 
detection and attribution analyses (Ch. 3: Detection and Attribution) indicate that an observed 29 
change has been influenced by human activities, and the projection is consistent with attribution. 30 
However, in many cases, especially at the regional scales considered in this assessment, a 31 
human-forced response may not yet have emerged from the noise of natural climate variability 32 
but may be expected to in the future (e.g., Hawkins and Sutton 2009, 2010). In such cases, 33 
confidence in such “projections without attribution” may still be significant under higher 34 
scenarios, if the relevant physical mechanisms of change are well understood. 35 
Scientific uncertainty encompasses multiple factors. The first is parametric uncertainty—the 36 
ability of GCMs to simulate processes that occur on spatial or temporal scales smaller than they 37 
can resolve. The second is structural uncertainty—whether GCMs include and accurately 38 
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represent all the important physical processes occurring on scales they can resolve. Structural 1 
uncertainty can arise because a process is not yet recognized—such as “tipping points” or 2 
mechanisms of abrupt change—or because it is known but is not yet understood well enough to 3 
be modeled accurately—such as dynamical mechanisms that are important to melting ice sheets 4 
(see Ch. 15: Potential Surprises). The third is climate sensitivity—a measure of the response of 5 
the planet to increasing levels of CO2, which is formally defined in Chapter 2: Physical Drivers 6 
of Climate Change as the equilibrium temperature change resulting from a doubling of CO2 7 
levels in the atmosphere relative to preindustrial levels. Various lines of evidence constrain the 8 
likely value of climate sensitivity to between 2.7°F and 8.1°F (1.5°C and 4.5°C; IPCC 2013b; 9 
see Ch. 2: Physical Drivers of Climate Change for further discussion). 10 
Which of these sources of uncertainty—human, natural, and scientific—is most important 11 
depends on the time frame and the variable considered. As future scenarios diverge (Figure 4.1), 12 
so too do projected changes in global and regional temperature (Hawkins and Sutton 2009). 13 
Uncertainty in the magnitude and sign of projected changes in precipitation and other aspects of 14 
climate is even greater. The processes that lead to precipitation happen at scales smaller than 15 
what can be resolved by even high-resolution models, requiring significant parameterization. 16 
Precipitation also depends on many large-scale aspects of climate, including atmospheric 17 
circulation, storm tracks, and moisture convergence. Due to the greater level of complexity 18 
associated with modeling precipitation, scientific uncertainty tends to dominate in precipitation 19 
projections throughout the entire century, affecting both the magnitude and sometimes 20 
(depending on location) the sign of the projected change in precipitation (Hawkins and Sutton 21 
2011). 22 
Over the next few decades, the greater part of the range or uncertainty in projected global and 23 
regional change will be the result of a combination of natural variability (mostly related to 24 
uncertainty in specifying the initial conditions of the state of the ocean; Deser et al. 2012b) and 25 
scientific limitations in our ability to model and understand the Earth’s climate system (Figure 26 
4.5). Differences in future scenarios, shown in orange in Figure 4.5, represent the difference 27 
between scenarios, or human activity. Over the short term, this uncertainty is relatively small. As 28 
time progresses, however, differences in various possible future pathways become larger and the 29 
delayed ocean response to these differences begins to be realized. By about 2030, the human 30 
source of uncertainty becomes increasingly important in determining the magnitude and patterns 31 
of future global warming. Even though natural variability will continue to occur, most of the 32 
difference between present and future climates will be determined by choices that society makes 33 
today and over the next few decades. The further out in time we look, the greater the influence of 34 
these human choices are on the magnitude of future warming. 35 
[INSERT FIGURE 4.5 HERE] 36 
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TRACEABLE ACCOUNTS  1 
Key Finding 1 2 
If greenhouse gas concentrations were stabilized at their current level, existing concentrations 3 
would commit the world to at least an additional 1.1°F (0.6°C) of warming over this century 4 
relative to the last few decades (high confidence in continued warming, medium confidence in 5 
amount of warming). 6 
Description of evidence base  7 
The basic physics underlying the impact of human emissions on global climate, and the role of 8 
climate sensitivity in moderating the impact of those emissions on global temperature, has been 9 
documented since the 1800s in a series of peer-reviewed journal articles that is summarized in a 10 
collection titled, “The Warming Papers: The Scientific Foundation for the Climate Change 11 
Forecast” (Archer and Pierrehumbert 2011).  12 
The estimate of committed warming at constant atmospheric concentrations is based on IPCC 13 
AR5 WG1, Chapter 12, section 12.5.2, page 1103 (Collins et al. 2013) which is in turn derived 14 
from AR4 WG1, Chapter 10, section 10.7.1, page 822 (Meehl et al. 2007). 15 
Major uncertainties  16 
The uncertainty in projected change under a commitment scenario is low and primarily the result 17 
of uncertainty in climate sensitivity. This key finding describes a hypothetical scenario that 18 
assumes all human-caused emissions cease and the Earth system responds only to what is already 19 
in the atmosphere. 20 
Assessment of confidence based on evidence and agreement, including short description of 21 
nature of evidence and level of agreement  22 
The statement has high confidence in the sign of future change and medium confidence in the 23 
amount of warming, based on the estimate of committed warming at constant atmospheric 24 
concentrations from Collins et al. (2013) based on Meehl et al. (2007) for a hypothetical scenario 25 
where concentrations in the atmosphere were fixed at a known level.  26 
Summary sentence or paragraph that integrates the above information 27 
The key finding is based on the basic physical principles of radiative transfer that have been well 28 
established for decades to centuries; the amount of estimated warming for this hypothetical 29 
scenario is derived from Collins et al. (2013) which is in turn based on Meehl et al. (2007) using 30 
CMIP3 models. 31 
 32 
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Key Finding 2 1 
Over the next two decades, global temperature increase is projected to be between 0.5°F and 2 
1.3°F (0.3°–0.7°C) (medium confidence). This range is primarily due to uncertainties in natural 3 
sources of variability that affect short-term trends. In some regions, this means that the trend may 4 
not be distinguishable from natural variability (high confidence).  5 
Description of evidence base  6 
The estimate of projected near-term warming under continued emissions of carbon dioxide and 7 
other greenhouse gases and aerosols was obtained directly from IPCC AR5 WG1(Kirtman et al. 8 
2013). 9 
The statement regarding the sources of uncertainty in near-term projections and regional 10 
uncertainty is based on Hawkins and Sutton (2009, 2011) and Deser et al. (2012a,b). 11 
Major uncertainties  12 
As stated in the key finding, natural variability is the primary uncertainty in quantifying the 13 
amount of global temperature change over the next two decades. 14 
Assessment of confidence based on evidence and agreement, including short description of 15 
nature of evidence and level of agreement  16 
The first statement regarding projected warming over the next two decades has medium 17 
confidence in the amount of warming due to the uncertainties described in the key finding. The 18 
second statement has high confidence, as the literature strongly supports the statement that 19 
natural variability is the primary source of uncertainty over time scales of years to decades 20 
(Deser et al. 2012a,b, 2014). 21 
Summary sentence or paragraph that integrates the above information 22 
The estimated warming presented in this KF is based on calculations reported by Kirtman et al. 23 
(2013). The key finding that natural variability is the most important uncertainty over the near-24 
term is based on multiple peer reviewed publications. 25 
 26 
Key Finding 3 27 
Beyond the next few decades, the magnitude of climate change depends primarily on cumulative 28 
emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols and the sensitivity of the climate system to those 29 
emissions (high confidence). Projected changes range from 4.7°–8.6°F (2.6°–4.8°C) under the 30 
higher RCP8.5 scenario to 0.5°–1.3°F (0.3°–1.7°C) under the lower RCP2.6 scenario, for 2081–31 
2100 relative to 1986–2005 (medium confidence). 32 
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Description of evidence base  1 
The estimate of projected long-term warming under continued emissions of carbon dioxide and 2 
other greenhouse gases and aerosols under the RCP scenarios was obtained directly from IPCC 3 
AR5 WG1 (Collins et al. 2013). 4 
All credible climate models assessed in Chapter 9 of the IPCC WG1 AR5 (IPCC 2013a) from the 5 
simplest to the most complex respond with elevated global mean temperature, the simplest 6 
indicator of climate change, when atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases increase. It 7 
follows then that an emissions pathway that tracks or exceeds RCP8.5 would lead to larger 8 
amounts of climate change. 9 
The statement regarding the sources of uncertainty in long-term projections is based on Hawkins 10 
and Sutton (2009, 2011). 11 
Major uncertainties  12 
As stated in the key finding, the magnitude of climate change over the long term is uncertain due 13 
to human emissions of greenhouse gases and climate sensitivity. 14 
Assessment of confidence based on evidence and agreement, including short description of 15 
nature of evidence and level of agreement  16 
The first statement regarding additional warming and its dependence on human emissions and 17 
climate sensitivity has high confidence, as understanding of the radiative properties of 18 
greenhouse gases and the existence of both positive and negative feedbacks in the climate system 19 
is basic physics, dating to the 19th century. The second has medium confidence in the specific 20 
magnitude of warming, due to the uncertainties described in the key finding.  21 
Summary sentence or paragraph that integrates the above information 22 
The estimated warming presented in this key finding is based on calculations reported by Collins 23 
et al. (2013). The key finding that human emissions and climate sensitivity are the most 24 
important sources of uncertainty over the long-term is based on both basic physics regarding the 25 
radiative properties of greenhouse gases, as well as a large body of peer reviewed publications. 26 
 27 
Key Finding 4 28 
Global mean atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) concentration has now passed 400 ppm, a level 29 
that last occurred about 3 million years ago, when global average temperature and sea level were 30 
significantly higher than today (high confidence). Continued growth in CO2 emissions over this 31 
century and beyond would lead to an atmospheric concentration not experienced in tens of 32 
millions of years (medium confidence). The present-day emissions rate of nearly 10 GtC per year 33 
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suggests that there is no climate analog for this century any time in at least the last 50 million 1 
years (medium confidence). 2 
Description of evidence base  3 
The key finding is based on a large body of research including Crowley (1990), Schneider et al. 4 
(2013), Lunt et al. (2012), Otto-Bleisner et al. (2013), NEEM (2013), Jouzel et al. (2007), Dutton 5 
et al. (2015), Seki et al. (2010), Haywood et al. (2013), Miller et al. (2012), Royer (2014), 6 
Bowen et al. (2015), Kirtland Turner et al. (2014), Penman et al. (2014), Zeebe et al. (2016), and 7 
summarized in NRC (2011) and Masson-Delmotte et al. (2013). 8 
Major uncertainties  9 
The largest uncertainty is the measurement of past sea level, given the contributions of not only 10 
changes in land ice mass, but also in solid earth, mantle, isostatic adjustments, etc. that occur on 11 
timescales of millions of years. This uncertainty increases the further back in time we go; 12 
however, the signal (and forcing) size is also much greater. There are also associated 13 
uncertainties in precise quantification of past global mean temperature and carbon dioxide levels. 14 
There is uncertainty in the age models used to determine rates of change and coincidence of 15 
response at shorter, sub-millennial timescales. 16 
Assessment of confidence based on evidence and agreement, including short description of 17 
nature of evidence and level of agreement  18 
High confidence in the likelihood statement that past global mean temperature and sea level rise 19 
were higher with similar or higher CO2 concentrations is based on Masson-Delmotte et al. (2013) 20 
in IPCC AR5. Medium confidence that no precise analog exists in 66 million years is based on 21 
Zeebe et al. (2016) as well as the larger body of literature summarized in Masson-Delmotte et al. 22 
(2013). 23 
Summary sentence or paragraph that integrates the above information 24 
The key finding is based on a vast body of literature that summarizes the results of observations, 25 
paleoclimate analyses, and paleoclimate modeling over the past 50 years and more. 26 
 27 
Key Finding 5 28 
The observed increase in global carbon emissions over the past 15–20 years has been consistent 29 
with higher scenarios (very high confidence). In 2014 and 2015, emission growth rates slowed as 30 
economic growth has become less carbon-intensive (medium confidence). Even if this trend 31 
continues, however, it is not yet at a rate that would meet the long-term temperature goal of the 32 
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Paris Agreement of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 3.6°F 1 
(2°C) above preindustrial levels (high confidence). 2 
Description of Evidence Base 3 
Observed emissions for 2014 and 2015 and estimated emissions for 2016 suggest a decrease in 4 
the growth rate and possibly even emissions of carbon; this shift is attributed primarily to 5 
decreased coal use in China although with significant uncertainty as noted in the references in 6 
the text. This statement is based on Tans and Keeling 2017; Raupach et al. 2007; Le Quéré et al. 7 
2009; Jackson et al. 2016; Korsbakken et al. 2016 and personal communication with Le Quéré 8 
(2017). 9 
The statement that the growth rate of carbon dioxide increased over the past 15–20 years is based 10 
on the data available here: https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/gr.html 11 
The evidence that actual emission rates track or exceed the RCP8.5 scenario are as follows. The 12 
actual emission of CO2 from fossil fuel consumption and concrete manufacture over the period 13 
2005–2014 is 90.11 Pg (Le Quéré et al. 2015). The RCP8.5 emissions over the same period 14 
assuming linear trends between years 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2020 in the specification is 99.24 15 
Pg. 16 
Actual emissions: 17 
http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/  and Le Quéré et al. (2015) 18 
RCP8.5 emissions 19 
http://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at:8787/RcpDb/dsd?Action=htmlpage&page=compare 20 
The numbers for fossil fuel and industrial emissions (RCP) compared to fossil fuel and cement 21 
emissions (observed) in units of GtC are 22 
 
RCP8.5 Actual difference 
2005 7.97 8.23 0.26 
2006 8.16 8.53 0.36 
2007 8.35 8.78 0.42 
2008 8.54 8.96 0.42 
2009 8.74 8.87 0.14 
2010 8.93 9.21 0.28 
2011 9.19 9.54 0.36 
2012 9.45 9.69 0.24 
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2013 9.71 9.82 0.11 
2014 9.97 9.89 -0.08 
2015 10.23 9.90 -0.34 
total 99.24 101.41 2.18 
    
 1 
Major Uncertainties 2 
None 3 
Assessment of confidence based on evidence and agreement, including short description of 4 
nature of evidence and level of agreement 5 
Very high confidence in increasing emissions over the last 20 years and high confidence in the 6 
fact that recent emission trends will not be sufficient to avoid 2°C. Medium confidence in recent 7 
findings that the growth rate is slowing. Climate change scales with the amount of anthropogenic 8 
greenhouse gas in the atmosphere. If emissions exceed RCP8.5, the likely range of changes 9 
temperatures and climate variables will be larger than projected. 10 
Summary sentence or paragraph that integrates the above information 11 
The key finding is based on basic physics relating emissions to concentrations, radiative forcing, 12 
and resulting change in global mean temperature, as well as on IEA data on national emissions as 13 
reported in the peer-reviewed literature. 14 
 15 
Key Finding 6 16 
Combining output from global climate models and dynamical and statistical downscaling models 17 
using advanced averaging, weighting, and pattern scaling approaches can result in more relevant 18 
and robust future projections. For some regions, sectors, and impacts, these techniques are 19 
increasing the ability of the scientific community to provide guidance on the use of climate 20 
projections for quantifying regional-scale changes and impacts (medium to high confidence). 21 
Description of evidence base  22 
The contribution of weighting and pattern scaling to improving the robustness of multimodel 23 
ensemble projections is described and quantified by a large body of literature as summarized in 24 
the text, including Sanderson et al. (2015) and Knutti et al. (2017). The state of the art of 25 
dynamical and statistical downscaling and the scientific community’s ability to provide guidance 26 
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regarding the application of climate projections to regional impact assessments is summarized in 1 
Kotamarthi et al. (2016) and supported by Feser et al. (2011) and Prein et al. (2015).  2 
Major uncertainties  3 
Regional climate models are subject to the same structural and parametric uncertainties as global 4 
models, as well as the uncertainty due to incorporating boundary conditions. The primary source 5 
of error in application of empirical statistical downscaling methods is inappropriate application, 6 
followed by stationarity. 7 
Assessment of confidence based on evidence and agreement, including short description of 8 
nature of evidence and level of agreement  9 
Advanced weighting techniques have significantly improved over previous Bayesian approaches; 10 
confidence in their ability to improve the robustness of multimodel ensembles, while currently 11 
rated as medium, is likely to grow in coming years. Downscaling has evolved significantly over 12 
the last decade and is now broadly viewed as a robust source for high-resolution climate 13 
projections that can be used as input to regional impact assessments. 14 
Summary sentence or paragraph that integrates the above information 15 
Scientific understanding of climate projections, downscaling, multimodel ensembles, and 16 
weighting has evolved significantly over the last decades to the extent that appropriate methods 17 
are now broadly viewed as robust sources for climate projections that can be used as input to 18 
regional impact assessments. 19 
  20 
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Figure 4.1: The climate projections used in this report are based on the 2010 Representative 1 
Concentration Pathways (RCP, right). They are largely consistent with scenarios used in 2 
previous assessments, the 2000 Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES, left). This figure 3 
compares SRES and RCP annual carbon emissions (GtC, first row), annual methane emissions 4 
(MtCH4, second row), nitrous oxide emissions (MtN2O, third row), carbon dioxide concentration 5 
in the atmosphere (ppm, fourth row), global mean temperature change relative to 1900–1960 that 6 
would result from the central estimate (lines) and the likely range (shaded areas) of climate 7 
sensitivity as calculated by an energy balance model (°F, fifth row), and global mean temperature 8 
change relative to 1900–1960 as simulated by CMIP3 models for the SRES scenarios and 9 
CMIP5 models for the RCP scenarios (°F, sixth row). Note that global mean temperature from 10 
SRES A1fi simulations are only available from four global climate models, hence the much 11 
smaller range. (Data from IIASA, CMIP3, and CMIP5). 12 
 13 
  14 
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2 Figure 4.4: C:rvIIP5 global climate models typically operate at coarser horizontal spatial scales 
3 0 11 the order of 50 to 300 kIll (30 to 200 nllles) , while regional climate models have much flner 
4 resolutions, 0 11 the order of 10 to 50 kIll (6 to 30 miles). Tills figure compares annual average 
5 precipitation (in millimeters) for the historical period 1979-2008 using (a) a resolution of 250 
6 kIll or 150 miles widl (b) a resolution of 2S kIll or 15 miles to illustrate the importance of spatial 
7 scale in resolving key topographical features, particularly along dIe coasts and in mountainous 
8 areas. In tIlls case , both simulations are by the GFDL lDRAM model , an experimental high-
9 resolution model. (Figure source: adapted from Dixon et al. 20 16). 
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Figure 4.5: The fraction of total variance in decadal mean surface air temperature predictions 
explained by the drree components of total uncertainty is shown for the lower 48 states (similar 
results are seen for Hawai ' i and Alaska , not shown) . Orange regions represent human or scenario 
uncertainty , blue regions represent model uncertainty , and green regions represent dIe internal 
variability component. A s the size of dIe region is reduced , the relative importance of internal 
variability increases. In interpreting this figure . it is important to remember that it shows dIe 
fractional sources of uncertainty. Total uncertainty increases as time progresses. (Figure source: 
adapted from Hawkins and Sutton 2009). 
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